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Abstract 
In this thesis we investigate the relationship between sustainable performance and firm 
performance within the basic materials industry. Specifically, and in line with prior studies, 
we demonstrate a significant, negative relationship between sustainable performance, (using 
Thomson Reuters Asset4 ESG-index) and financial firm performance (return on assets and 
Tobin’s q) for a panel data sample between 2003 and 2013 of 94 European basic materials 
firms. Like many previous researchers, we find inconclusive results when testing whether this 
relationship is linear or non-linear. We discuss the implications of these findings. 
 
Key words: Corporate Sustainability, ESG, Financial performance, and Basic materials 
industry, Europe 
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1. Introduction 
In the following section we introduce the link between corporate sustainability and financial 
performance. We discuss the practical and academic importance, and present a summary of 
our results. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
The modern world is confronted with numerous environmental and social problems due to the 
scarcity of resources in combination with a continuously growing world population and the 
constant threat of climate change. To mitigate these problems and reverse global degradation, 
much hope is placed in the concept of sustainable development. It is argued that a substantial 
part of the environmental and social problems are caused by the corporate world and its short-
term view on profitability. Therefore, firms’ sustainable activities are vital to the solution, and 
the success of sustainability-related objectives will largely be determined by corporate 
sustainability (Peylo, 2012).  
 
There is an ongoing debate on the exact definition of corporate sustainability and what this 
concept contains. However, most of the proposed definitions state that corporate sustainability 
contains various aspects that need to be considered simultaneously and is often clustered into 
three main subgroups: Environmental (E), Social (S), and Corporate Governance (G). Hence, 
ESG is a catch-all term for measuring corporate sustainability (Schaltegger and Synnestvedt, 
2002; Steger, 2006). Therefore, for the remainder of this thesis ESG refers to corporate 
sustainability. 
 
In today’s capitalistic society, firm survival depends on its ability to gain profits and 
investment decisions are largely based on economic payback projections. Therefore, in order 
to motivate the vast majority of firms to engage in ESG activities there needs to be financial 
benefits from doing so. As of today, however, research is still lacking to justify the financial 
implications of firms’ sustainable actions, and there is limited empirical evidence that such 
investments indeed lead to profitability or enhance firm value. Previous research on the 
relationship between ESG performance and financial performance presents mixed results 
(Singal, 2014). Therefore, the economic incentive of ESG activities remains questionable.  
 
This thesis contributes to the discussion regarding the relation between ESG and financial 
performance, and in particular deepens the understanding for this link in the European basic 
materials industry.  The basic materials industry consists of firms who often use natural 
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resources in the production process, such as chemicals, metals, pulp and mining. These 
companies are considered to have a high impact on both environment and societies thus, are 
in a greater position to address sustainability issues (Halme, M and Huse, M., 1997). This 
industry is of particular interest since prior studies on ESG often use negative screening when 
selecting the firms to investigate. This is a selection process where firms or entire industries 
are actively excluded from the study because they are involved in practices that are 
considered unsustainable by nature. According to Lee et al (2009) there is a bias towards 
firms belonging to the financial services, healthcare and technology industries in prior studies, 
and firms from the basic materials sector are often automatically excluded due to the negative 
screening process. Hence, this study addresses an academic gap through an exploration of the 
relation between firm performance and sustainable performance of the basic materials sector.  
As such, it contributes to both the corporate sustainability literature and the financial 
literature, and is also of interest to practitioners and other stakeholders in the basic materials 
industry.  
 
Our results indicate a negative relationship between ESG and financial performance in the 
European basic materials industry. Hence, the financial benefits of ESG activities do not 
outweigh the costs. Stringent regulation regarding ESG performance forces the firms to invest 
in sustainability and thus increase costs. However, firms within the basic materials industry 
are unable to reap the benefits normally associated with improved ESG performance. A 
crucial element for the business case of ESG is improved stakeholder relations, which create 
competitive advantages on markets such as the consumer market, employers market, and 
financial market. In the European basic materials industry this is not achieved since the ESG 
activities are not in consonance with the firms’ character due to the unsustainable nature of 
their business, and are thus not perceived as credible by stakeholders. Hence, stakeholder 
relations are not improved why firms cannot create a competitive advantage and reap 
financial benefits within this industry.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In section 2, we establish our theoretical 
framework and introduce previous research on ESG and its financial implications. We also 
state our hypotheses. In section 3, we present our methodology and data set. This includes a 
presentation of our models. In section 4, we present our results and analysis. Finally, in 
section 5, we present our conclusion. 
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2. Theory and Hypotheses 
In this section, we present different economic views on the link between ESG and financial 
performance, as well as a summary of results from previous empirical research. Finally we 
present our hypotheses.             
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Investing in ESG activities is by no doubt a costly investment for the firm. However, prior 
studies present many financial benefits of doing such investments, which under the right 
conditions can outweigh the costs. These are crucial for the reader to be aware of in order to 
understand the scope of investigation in this study: whether or not the financial benefits of 
ESG outweighs the costs of ESG in the European basic materials industry. Since the costs are 
more apparent than the financial benefits, more emphasis will be put on explaining the 
benefits in the following sections.   
2.1 The positive relationship between ESG and financial performance 
The revisionist economic view argues that an ESG oriented strategy can lead to cost 
reductions and revenue increases for firms. This view is based on the stakeholder theory 
which emphasizes that firms should not only meet the requirements of the shareholders, but 
also those of a variety of stakeholders, whose support is crucial for the existence of the firm 
(Freeman, 1984). Engaging in ESG is a way to meet these requirements and improve 
stakeholder relations, which creates a competitive advantage on various markets and has a 
clear positive bearing on firm profitability.  
 
Some argue that ESG improves a firm’s relationship towards consumers, and thus creates a 
competitive advantage on the consumer market. The improved relationship derives from a 
better reputation and improved firm image (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Waddock and Graves 
(1997) prove that a firm’s ESG rating has an economically and statistically significant 
positive effect on firm reputation. The improved relationship towards consumers could 
positively affect a firm’s financial performance since it can entice end-consumers to buy a 
firm’s products or services. Therefore, firms may reap price premiums or gain increase in 
market share. However, the financial impact of this relationship is stronger for firms in the 
business-to-consumer industries than firms in the business-to-business industries (Sahut and 
Pasquini-Descomps, 2015; Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). This indicates that firms closer to the 
end-consumers have more incentives to engage in ESG activities.   
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Moreover, a firm can improve its relationship towards current employees and increase its 
attractiveness towards potential employees by engaging in ESG activities, and thus gain 
competitive advantages on the employer’s market (Economist, 2008). Employees are getting 
increasingly interested in working for firms with an ESG oriented agenda (Sprinkle and 
Maines, 2010). This indicates that a firm with such an agenda can retain their employees for a 
longer period of time and will attract more applicants to their vacancies. To retain the same 
employees affects the profitability positively, since the firm does not have to train and educate 
new staff to the same extent as firms with a higher employee turnover (Balakrishnan, R. 
Sprinkle, G.B., Williamson M.G, 2011). Furthermore, employee retention could also affect 
the financial performance positively since it is correlated with increased effectiveness, as an 
employee is more effective the longer he/she has worked in the same place. Further, a 
competitive employer attracts the best employees, who are likely to have a positive effect on 
financial results (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, engagement in ESG activities can improve a firm’s relationship towards 
stakeholders on the financial market and thus gain competitive advantages on this market. 
Some researchers argue that firms who engage in ESG are regarded as more considerate of 
their future license to operate, why they are deemed by stakeholders on the financial market to 
be less risky than their peers (for overview, see: Deutsche Bank Group, 2012). Therefore, the 
cost of capital for these firms is lower than for their competitors both regarding cost of debt 
and cost of equity, due to the lowered risk premium put on them (Peylo, 2012). Some also 
argue that internal costs, such as agency costs, are reduced since firms engaging in ESG are 
more likely than their peers to report on ESG measures (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 
2015). 
 
Some ESG activities can also result in direct cost reductions through operating efficiency 
benefits. When complying with increasingly stringent regulations regarding ESG performance 
firms avoid lawsuits and fines. Increased energy efficiency leads to reduced energy costs, and 
recycling of materials reduces waste and lowers materials costs (Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997). 
 
There are studies that have proved a positive relationship between firm performance and ESG. 
In particular, many researchers have found that the corporate governance parameter of ESG 
has a positive effect on financial results (Deutsche Bank, 2012).  The majority of these studies 
have focused on investigating the likelihood of sustainability as a factor of long-term value 
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 9 
creation (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Lee et al. (2009) claim that firms with superior sustainability 
performance enjoy lower idiosyncratic risks, and Goss (2009) show that firms with inferior 
sustainability performance face a higher risk of experiencing financial distress. In financial 
terms, Goss and Roberts (2011) found that firms with the most inferior sustainability 
performance face between 7 and 18 basis points more on their bank debt compared to better 
performing firms. Additionally, El Ghoul et al. (2011) found that firms voluntarily disclosing 
sustainability initiatives would overall enjoy lower cost of capital.     
2.2 The negative relationship between ESG and financial performance  
In contrast to the revisionist view, the neoclassical economists argue that ESG increases a 
firm’s costs without providing enough economic compensation to make sustainable 
investments financially viable. Neoclassical economists often argue that ESG at its best 
entails a zero-sum tradeoff with corporate financial interests (Burke and Logsdon, 1996). 
According to this direction of thought, a corporate sustainability initiative consisting of 
stringent environmental standards is believed to lead to higher costs for companies, in 
particular for those in sectors that are sensitive to environmental issues such as the basic 
materials industry. As the environment and natural resources are the main production factors, 
imposing limitations on them will increase costs and limit the firm’s ability to grow (Palmer 
et al., 1995; Siebert et al., 1980). Neoclassical economists often base their arguments on the 
shareholder theory, stating that the only social responsibility of business is to increase profits, 
and that doing otherwise, such as investing resources in costly sustainability initiatives, will 
necessarily reduce shareholder value (Friedman, 1962). 
 
Taking on sustainable measures does require investments in new resource efficient machinery 
and implementation of new internal processes (Sahut and Pasquini-Descomps, 2015), and 
there are evident costs arising from the implementation of a sustainable structure (Porter, 
1991). Walley and Whitehead  (1994) demonstrates that the environmental costs are at its 
worst for pollution- intensive industries such as the basic materials industry. Further, when 
regulatory compliance rather than profit maximization drives the activities of a firm, a 
negative relationship between financial firm performance and ESG performance is expected, 
since these activities increase the costs of the firm without resulting in enough economic 
compensation to offset these costs (Baron, 2001; Baron et al., 2009). 
 
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 10 
Many studies have shown negative relationships between financial and sustainable firm 
performance. Hart and Ahuja (1996) do an empirical study on American firms investigating 
the effect of ESG on several financial firm performance ratios, and find that from an 
accounting based view, there is a short term penalty on firms exercising ESG actions. 
Cordeiro and Sarkis, (1997) do a study on 532 American firms, and demonstrate that there is a 
significant, negative relationship between environmental pro-activism and security analyst 1- 
and 5-year earnings performance forecasts. Also, from a market-driven point of view, Worrell 
et. al. (1995) find significantly negative stock market reactions to announcements related to 
ESG initiatives over a 5-year period. Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001) conducts a study on 482 
American firms who either advocate a pro-active stance, implementing ESG into their 
processes, or who focus on so called ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions that relies on external recycling 
and recovery of waste. They found significantly negative relationships between ESG- and 
firm performance both on firms advocating the more pro-active solutions and the end-of-pipe 
implementations.  
2.4 The non-linear relationship between ESG and financial performance 
Several researchers argue that the relationship between ESG and financial performance is 
non-linear (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Wagner and Schaltegger, 2004; Schaltegger and 
Synnestvedt, 2002; Steger, 2006; Wagner et al., 2001; Crifo, Forget, and Teyssier, 2015). 
This relationship could be an explanation to why empirical researchers previously have found 
mixed or inconclusive results (see Salzmann et al, 2005;Wagner et al., 2001; Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Jayachandran et al., 2013; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000) ESG initiatives can have positive as well as negative effects on a firm’s financial 
performance depending on the individual position of a firm on the curve. However, the 
characteristics of the proposed non-linear relationship differ between studies. For example, 
Barnett and Salomon (2012) suggest that the true relationship is u-shaped while Wagner and 
Schaltegger (2004) argue that it has an inverse u-shape. 
 
The study conducted by Barnett and Salomon (2012) is investigating the relationship between 
ESG efforts and financial performance and shows that it is u-shaped. They state that firms 
benefit from either having none (or a very low amount of) ESG activities or having a lot of 
them. The breaking point, where the negative relationship turns to positive, depends on the 
firm’s capacity to create better relationships with their stakeholders through the ESG 
activities. Furthermore, they argue that the key to improve stakeholder relationships lies in the 
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credibility of the ESG efforts. To be perceived as credible by stakeholders, ESG initiatives 
have to be made continuously and be in consonance with the firm’s character. However, if 
these criteria are not fulfilled, the ESG activities can be perceived as self-serving or 
”greenwashing” and thus lose credibility among stakeholders (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). 
 
Wagner and Schaltegger (2004) state that an inverse u-shaped relationship between 
environmental performance and financial performance demonstrates a win-win relationship, 
where improved environmental performance also leads to an improved financial performance. 
To create this inverse u-shape, a firm should use a profit maximizing strategy when choosing 
which environmental activities to undertake. However, the possibility of achieving the win-
win relationship depends on the minimum level of environmental performance as required by 
regulation. If a firm faces stringent regulation, the optimal level of environmental 
performance may be the one that the regulation imposes. Going beyond this point may result 
in a trade-off between better environmental performance and worse economic performance, in 
line with the neoclassical view. The relationship is demonstrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Link between Environmental and Economic Performance and  
Regulatory Influences (CES = Corporate Environmental Strategy).  
(Wagner and Schaltegger, 2004) 
 
 
However, if the firm does not face stringent regulation, it can improve financial results by 
improving environmental performance. This is given that the environmental activities are 
value-oriented, meaning that they are in consonance with the firm’s character (Wagner and 
Schaltegger, 2004). 
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2.5 Hypotheses 
The objective of this study is to determine if there is a relationship between ESG- and 
financial performance for firms in the European basic materials industry. To test this 
empirically we set up two hypotheses.  
 
The first hypothesis examines the relationship between ESG- and financial performance. As 
the environment and natural resources are the main production factors in the basic materials 
industry, imposing limitations on them increase costs and limits the firm’s ability to grow 
(Palmer et al., 1995; Siebert et al., 1980). We hypothesize that this relationship is negative 
since firms within the basic materials industry may find it hard to reap the financial benefits 
of ESG but are forced to bear the costs due stringent regulation. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between ESG-performance and financial 
performance in the European basic materials industry. 
 
The second hypothesis examines if there is a non-linear relationship between ESG 
performance and financial performance. We hypothesize that the relationship is non-linear on 
the basis of several arguments. First, since there are not only financial disadvantages to ESG 
but also financial advantages a non-linear relationship is indicated. Also, many previous 
studies investigating on a linear framework have found mixed or inconclusive results, which 
also indicate that the relationship is more complex than a linear relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a non-linear relationship between ESG-performance and financial 
performance in the European basic materials industry. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
First, we outline our models by discussing ESG performance and financial performance as 
variables, and the difficulties we encounter when we measure them. Second, we present 
relevant control variables. Third, we outline our dataset and the models we use to investigate 
the relationship between financial performance and ESG. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 ESG performance  
We use a recognized constructed index when we measure ESG performance, as opposed to 
the alternatives of constructing our own index, or performing interviews. We use Thomson 
Reuters’ Asset4 ESG sustainability index, which uses a uniform measure for ESG 
performance, by rating companies against more than 250 key performance indicators (KPIs) 
and more than 750 individual data points. The index covers more than 4300 firms covering 
the following indices: MSCI World, MSCI Europe, STOXX 600, Nasdaq 100, Russell 2000, 
SandP500, FTSE 100, ASX 300 and MSCI Emerging Market (Thomson Reuters). 
 
As mentioned before, ESG consists of three sub factors, the Environmental factor, the Social 
factor, and the (corporate) Governance factor. First, the Environmental factor examines the 
performance within: resource usage and reduction, emissions and emissions reductions, 
environmental activism, and initiative and product or process innovation. Second, the Social 
factor looks to performance within: employment quality, health and safety issues, training, 
diversity, human rights, community involvement, and product responsibility. Third, the 
Governance factor examines performance within: board structure, compensation policy, board 
functions, financial and operational transparency, shareholder rights, and vision and strategy. 
More details on what key performance indicators are appreciated under each pillar are 
presented in Appendix 4.  
 
Sustainable performance is difficult to measure quantitatively since it consists of qualitative 
factors (Graves and Waddock, 1994), and due to different levels of transparency it is also 
difficult to understand and interpret ESG performance of a firm. One problem with ESG is 
that there is no common consensus on what social responsibility really means, and as of 
today, there are no fully accepted reporting standards when it comes to ESG performance 
(Thomson Reuters). ESG metrics, tools and rankings, even though they continue to evolve 
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and become more precise, should be viewed “with a heavy dose of skepticism” according to 
Maclean (2012). Further, the identification of key performance indicators varies across 
studies and is a crucial problem with a large impact on the research (Ullmann, 1985). Carroll 
(1979) argues that social responsibility should be divided into 4 different categories ranging 
over not only the environmental but also economic, legal, ethical and discretionary fields, and 
also identified two main problems: first, that sustainable issues differs depending on industry 
and, second, issues also differs across time. Time trends are apparent to change when it comes 
to product safety, occupational safety, business ethics, environment, discrimination and 
consumerism, as it has changed over time and most certainly will change in the times to 
come. Further, the time reference highlights that caution should be taken when looking over 
longer time periods. Thus, ESG is not only difficult to appreciate, but there is also a lack of 
agreement on what should and should not be viewed as a sustainable measure, which can 
cause a measurement error in the ESG variables.   
 
According to Graves and Waddock (1994), the usage of a broad index can help overcome 
problems associated with measuring sustainable performance, since an index uniformly 
measures sustainable performance for a consistent range of important issues across a wide 
range of companies. This is our reason for choosing the index constructed by Thomson 
Reuters’ Asset4, as a proxy for ESG performance. The data points that are collected stems 
from public available resources, such as company reports, company filings, company 
websites, NGO websites, CSR reports and media (Thomson Reuters, 2015). The database has 
a high credibility as it is used by recognized leading firms, such as BlackRock, KBC Asset 
Management, and Green Alpha. 
 
3.2 Dependent variables 
We measure financial performance with one accounting based, and one market based 
approach. The ratios are return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s q. The reader should note that 
our financial performance measures are merely summary measures of performance and 
limited to a brief time period. This should be considered as a limitation of our study, as it only 
appreciates a fragment of our firms’ financial performance.  
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3.2.1 ROA 
ROA is an accounting-based measure, and an indicator of the financial health of the firm. 
ROA captures the internal efficiency of the firm as it measures the firm’s use of capital and 
attempts to answer the question of what the profitability of investments in real asset is (Bodie 
et al., 2014). Firms with higher ROA offer prospects of better returns on the firm’s 
investments, and should have a heightened ability to raise capital in security markets than 
firms with lower ROA (ibid.).  
 
ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest to total assets: 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + ((𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑)  ×  (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒))
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟′𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟′𝑠 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ×  100
 
 
 
3.2.2 Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q is a market-based performance measure. The market-based measures give 
indications of the effectiveness of the firm from an investment perspective and represent the 
response of the market to internal organizational decisions (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
 
Tobin’s q measures the financial performance by comparing the market value of the assets to 
the replacement cost, or the book value, of the same assets. Firms with values above 1.0 have 
been found to be better investment opportunities, have higher growth, and are an indication of 
firm success (Wolfe et al., 2005). 
  
Tobin’s q is defined as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
Many recognized and cited studies only include a few control variables. Such as Margolis et 
al. (2007) who’s model only controls for size, risk, and industry. Including few variables often 
cause endogeneity to the variables included in the models. We approve upon previous 
research by adding more control variables to our model. We combine factors that are included 
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in different prior studies when examining the relationship between firm performance and 
sustainable performance, and include variables that have been found to have an impact on our 
dependent variables (ROA and Tobin’s q) when estimating firm performance. The model 
includes ten to eleven independent variables; of which one to two are variables of interest 
(measuring ESG) and three are dummy variables.   
 
We consider firm size, risk, business sector, age, leverage, country, and year as control 
variables in our study as they affect both financial performance and ESG performance 
according to previous studies (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Galbreath and Shum, 2012; Wu, 
2006; Margolis et al. 2007; Feldman et al.,1997; Rettab et al., 2009; Saeidia et al., 2015; 
Barron et al., 1994; Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Mendelson, 1970; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000; Gleason and Klock, 2006; Halme, M. and Huse, M. 1997). The arguments for what 
control variables are included, and the anticipated magnitude and signs are developed in 
Appendix 5.  
 
3.4 Dataset 
The ESG scores are our starting point when we collect firm information. The scores are 
obtained as 3 separate scores for each firm from Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 database. The E, S, 
and G scores are distributed on a scale varying from 0 to a 100, 0 being the poorest 
performance on the scale, and 100 being the best performance on the scale. 
First, we download scores on all European firms in the database, which are 1157 firms in 
total. Second, we download scores on all basic materials firms in the database (a global 
sample), which are 583 firms in total. By doing a cross-reference search in excel, we arrive at 
94 European basic materials firms in total, which constitute our sample.   
 
We collect panel data over 11 years, from 2003 to 2013. We consider this a sufficient time 
frame to get enough data points but narrow enough to be able to make generalizations over 
time, in line with the arguments of Carroll (1979). 
 
Due to the fact that some firms are created within the time frame, the maximum amount of 
data points for a variable is 1016. For some variables there are no record for all years, which 
explains why there is a lower amount of data points for some variables than others.   
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's q 986 1.50 1.25 0.76 0.68 4.47 
ROA 995 6.70 6.05 7.69 -15.36 37.37 
Size 968 15.00 15.02 1.60 6.48 19.44 
Age 1016 68.63 62 52.62 0 196 
R&D 665 1.70 0.84 2.40 0 13.08 
Leverage 1014 33.45 34.61 20.84 0 207.61 
Risk 947 0.05 0.045 0.024 0.012 1.63 
E 788 73.01 84.92 25.13 8.78 97.04 
S 788 69.10 79.33 26.67 3.59 98.56 
G 788 56.06 60.68 26.49 1.91 96.74 
       
 
The data points of the financial performance of the firms are from Thomson Reuters’ 
Worldscope Global Databases, a premier source of financial statement data on firms outside 
the USA,that in 2010 included approximately 37,000 active firms, representing 95% of global 
market capitalization (Worldscope Data Definition Guide, 2014).  
 
Our investigated firms are distributed over the following business sectors: Chemicals, Mineral 
Resources, and Applied Resources as follows (see table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Business sectors N 
Mineral Resources 53 
Chemicals 26 
Applied Resources 15 
Total 94 
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The sample consists of firms from 18 European countries. A large proportion (more than 
30%) of our investigated firms originates from the United Kingdom. Hence, the reader should 
note that our sample may not perfectly represent the basic materials industry in Europe.  
 
Table 3.2   
 
   
Country N  Country N 
UK 29  Norway 3 
Germany  10  Poland 3 
Switzerland 8  Turkey 3 
Finland 7  Ireland 2 
France 6  Italy 2 
Sweden 5  Portugal 2 
Austria 4  Spain 2 
Belgium 3  Denmark 1 
Netherlands 3  Greece 1 
Total      94 
 
3.5 Quantitative Model 
When dealing with panel data the simplest and most straight forward way is to estimate a 
pooled regression, where all the data is estimated in a single equation using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator (Brooks, 2014). OLS assumes that the average values of the 
variables and the relationships between them are constant over time and across all cross-
sectional units in the sample (Brooks, 2014). Overall, the variables show little variation within 
each object, and especially for the firms that only have recorded ESG scores over a few years. 
Therefore, the starting point for our model is an OLS estimator, see model (1).  
 
(1) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
𝜑 =  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑞, 𝑅𝑂𝐴) 
𝐸𝑆𝐺 = 𝐸𝑆𝐺 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒, 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 = 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷 = 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 19 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  
𝑖 = 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚  
𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) use a time lag on ESG in their study, to allow for the ESG scores to 
materialize on the financial performance ratios, why we also choose to lag ESG scores by one 
year in all our models. In Appendix 2 model (8) is tested without the lag on ESG, and the 
coefficient of ESG is insignificant. This supports our use of a 1-year lag of ESG in our 
models. We deal with outliers by winsorizing our data in Stata. We address potential 
heteroscedasticity by using the cluster id command in Stata, and by using robust standard 
errors. 
 
In model (1) ESG is measured as an equally weighted proxy of the individual scores. Since 
some prior research suggests that ESG should be measured as a disaggregated score we also 
use the scores separately in models (2), (3) and (4). In our sample, the correlation between the 
E and the S scores is more than 0.8 (see appendix 3). Hence, to mitigate the effect of 
multicollinearity in our model, we put together the E and S scores as an equally weighted 
aggregated score, naming it the E/S score. Since the correlation between the E/S score and the 
G score still is 0.4, we drop one of them in the disaggregated models (2) and (3). First we 
drop the G score, see model (2), and then drop the E/S score in the following estimation, see 
model (3). In model (4) we include both the E/S score and the G score. 
 
(2) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
(3) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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(4) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
As there is some variation of ESG scores within each firm over the years, we want to 
investigate what occurs when removing the effects of variables that don’t change over time. 
Therefore, we use a fixed effects (FE) model, see model (5).  
 
(5) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   
 
We test for a (inverse) u-shaped relationship between ESG and financial performance by 
adding squared ESG performance to model (1), see model (6) 
 
(6) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
2 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
We also test for nonlinearity in the relationship between ESG and financial performance by 
transforming ESG performance into log, implying that a 1 % increase in ESG causes a 0.01 ×
 𝛽1increase in 𝜑𝑖𝑡, see model (7) 
 
(7) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
We deal with outliers by winsorizing our data in Stata. We address potential 
heteroscedasticity by using the cluster id command in Stata, and by using robust standard 
errors.  
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 21 
4. Results and Analysis 
In the following section we present our results and analyze them accordingly. We finish this 
section with a summary and evaluation of our hypotheses  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 The negative relationship between ESG and financial performance 
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show that when controlling for size, age, R&D, risk, leverage, 
country, subsector, and year, an improved ESG score has a negative effect on financial 
performance when measured as both Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
4.1.1 Aggregated ESG performance 
In table 4.1 we present the results we obtain when we run model (1):   
 
(1) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Table 4.1 Impact of ESG  (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
ESG _t-1  -.0067**  -.0598*** 
  (.0028)  (.0224) 
Size  .1251**  1.403*** 
  (.0492)  (.4185) 
Age  -.0120  .0497 
  (.0432)  (.4427) 
R&D  .0523**  .0727 
  (.0233)  (.2225) 
Risk  .0005  .0526 
  (.0067)  (.0663) 
Leverage  -.0064*  -.1183*** 
  (.0038)  (.0229) 
Constant  -.5673  -9.7161 
  (1.0250)  (9.0210) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6361 0.5064 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 22 
When we test model (1), we find that aggregated ESG score has a statistically significant 
negative effect on both Tobin’s Q and ROA (see table 4.1). The results indicate that an 
increase in ESG score by one unit results in a 0.007 decrease in Tobin’s q and a 0.06 decrease 
in ROA. Our results are in line with several studies investigating the relationship between 
ESG and financial performance, such as Hart and Ahuja (1996), Worrell et. al. (1995), 
Cordeiro and Sarkis, (1997), and Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), who all find evidence of a 
negative relationship between ESG performance and firm performance. The found negative 
effect is relatively small in magnitude compared to the effect of the control variables, 
meaning that ESG affects financial performance less than firm size, R&D expenditure and 
leverage. This is in line with previous studies that also confirm the effect of ESG to be 
relatively small. 
 
The relationship between our control variables and financial performance are in general as 
expected and in line with previous research. Size has a positive impact on both financial 
performance measurements in all regressions as anticipated. R&D has a significant positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q but not a significant impact on ROA. This is in line with previous 
studies, indicating a stronger relationship between R&D intensity and market based financial 
measurements than accounting based. We keep R&D as a control variable when regressing on 
return on assets although it is insignificant, since the theoretical framework supports it (see 
appendix 5). Further, leverage has a statistically significant negative effect on return on assets 
but not on Tobin’s q, which is in line with previous research (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). 
Unexpectedly, the effect of risk and age are not statistically significant for either Tobin’s Q or 
ROA. This may imply that the models still suffer from omitted variable bias and endogeneity, 
which should be taken into consideration as a limitation of the model. 
4.1.2 Disaggregated ESG performance 
In table 4.2 we present the results we obtain when we run model (2): 
  
(2) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Table 4.2 Impact of E/S (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
E/S_t-1  -.0056**  -.0482** 
  (.0275)  (.0202) 
Size  .1205**  1.3517*** 
  (.0473)  (.4146) 
Age  -.0083  .0782 
  (.0425)  (.4434) 
R&D  .0499**  .0450 
  (.0231)  (.2171) 
Risk  .0009  .0559 
  (.0067)  (.0656) 
Leverage  -.0068*  -.1221 
  (.0037)  (.0224) 
Constant  -.4865  -9.1642 
  (.1.0156)  (9.0597) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6343 0.5037 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
   
   
When we test model (2), the stand-alone effect of the E/S score, we find a significant negative 
effect on both Tobin’s q and on ROA (see table 4.2). Hence, firms that improve their joint E 
and S scores by one unit would expect a decrease in Tobin’s q by 0.006, and a decrease in 
ROA by 0.05. Here the effect is larger on ROA than on Tobin’s q, in line with the results 
from prior studies.  
 
In table 4.3 we present the results we obtain when we run model (3): 
 
(3) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
When we test model (3), the stand-alone effect of the G score, we find a significant negative 
effect on both Tobin’s q and on ROA (see table 4.3). A decrease by one unit in G score 
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implies a decrease by 0.004 in Tobin’s q, and a decrease in 0.04 in ROA. Again the negative 
effect is larger for ROA than for Tobin’s q.  
 
Table 4.3 Impact of G (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
G _t-1  -.0039*  -.0385** 
  (.0021)  (.0191) 
Size  .1112**  1.2947*** 
  (.0551)  (.4314) 
Age  -.0222  -.0439 
  (.0447)  (.4449) 
R&D  .0466*  .0302 
  (.0251)  (.2347) 
Risk  .0007  .0531 
  (.0070)  (.0695) 
Leverage  -.0071  -.1230*** 
  (.0043)  (.0251) 
Constant  -.5396  -9.5457 
  (1.1187)  (9.2980) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6289 0.5013 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
When we test model (3), the stand-alone effect of the G score, we find a significant negative 
effect on both Tobin’s q and on ROA (see table 4.3). A decrease by one unit in G score 
implies a decrease by 0.004 in Tobin’s q, and a decrease in 0.04 in ROA. Again the negative 
effect is larger for ROA than for Tobin’s q. Moreover, the effect is significant on a 5% 
significance level on ROA, compared to 10% significance level on Tobin’s q.   
 
In table 4.4 we present the results we obtain when we run model (4): 
 
(4) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Louise Dufwa 
My Hammarström 
 25 
 
Table 4.4 Impact of E/S and G (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
E/S_t-1  -.0046  -.0363 
  (.0032)  (.0230) 
G_t-1  -.0021  -.0239 
  (.0023)  (.0212) 
Size  .1251**  1.4040*** 
  (.0495)  (.4194) 
Age   .0116  .0400 
  (.0422)  (.4442) 
R&D  .0522**  .0742 
  (.0233)  (.2251) 
Risk  .0006  .0522 
  (.0067)  (.0664) 
Leverage  -.0065*  -.1181*** 
  (.0039)  (.0232) 
Constant  -.5631  -9.7857 
  (1.0591)  (9.1064) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6361 0.5065 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
When we test model (4), i.e. having the disaggregated E/S and G scores in one model, we get 
an insignificant negative relationship (see table 4.4). Both the E/S coefficient and the G 
coefficient on both Tobin’s q and ROA have negative signs, as predicted. Multicollinearity is 
indicated in model (4) as the regression of this model, including both of the disaggregated 
variables, finds an insignificant coefficient of the independent variables E/S and G, and 
models (2) and (3), measuring the stand-alone effects of the E/S- and G scores in two separate 
models show significant results. Hence, more reliability should be put to models (1), (2), and 
(3), who all indicate significant negative results. 
 
In line with previous research, the results indicate that the E/S score has a more substantial 
negative effect on financial performance than the corporate governance score. Since the 
magnitude of the negative effect of the E/S score is similar to the one of the aggregated ESG 
score, we can conclude that most of the negative effect from ESG on financial results derives 
from the E/S parameters. Also, in contrast to some previous studies that state that corporate 
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governance has a positive effect on financial results, this study shows that in the European 
basic materials industry, also corporate governance has a negative effect. As previously 
mentioned, the magnitude of this negative effect is smaller than for the E/S score in line with 
prior studies (Deutsche bank, 2012) 
 
4.1.3 Aggregated ESG performance (Fixed Effects) 
In table 4.5 we present the results we obtain when we run model (5): 
 
(5) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡   
 
 
Table 4.5 Impact of ESG (FE) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
ESG_t-1  -.0003  -.0320 
  (.0031)  (.0254) 
Size  .4729***  3.7381*** 
  (.1019)  (.7745) 
Age  .4369***  2.3891 
  (.1606)  (1.9448) 
R&D  -.0504  -.5951 
  (.0502)  (.5008) 
Risk  .0287**  .1991* 
  (.0135)  (.1038) 
Leverage  -.0048  -.1272*** 
  (.0036)  (.0305) 
Constant  -8.2509***  -59.4134*** 
  (2.0658)  (17.2492) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared (within) 0.4247 0.3922 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
When we use fixed effects, see model (5), we find an insignificant negative effect of ESG on 
ROA and on Tobin’s q. When removing the time constant effects, our results are not robust as 
they are no longer significant. Other studies also face the same robustness problem when 
measuring the relationship between ESG and firm performance. For example, Barnett and 
Salomon (2012) who estimates ESG performance in relation to ROA, also finds significant 
results when using an OLS model, but insignificant results when using a Fixed Effects model. 
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The results are further in line with arguments put forward by McKinnish (2000) who states 
that insignificant results from a Fixed Effects model, should not be interpreted as finding no 
effect, since these models tends to cause the coefficient estimates to become “considerably 
smaller, and often insignificant” (ibid.). Similar results is also presented by Freeman (1984), 
and by Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999), who show that models such as Fixed Effects 
tend to estimate smaller effects than models such as OLS. We argue that our result from our 
Fixed Effects model is caused by measurement errors in the ESG variables, in combination 
with temporal persistence in our independent variables. The measurement errors are likely to 
stem from problems such as the subjective quantitative appreciation of qualitative factors, 
lack of consensus, and lack of fully accepted reporting standards of ESG performance (Graves 
and Waddock, 1994; MacLean, 2012; Ullmann, 1985; Carroll, 1979). Thus, some caution 
should be taken into consideration when making inferences from our results, but as our 
overall results strongly suggests a negative relationship between ESG performance and 
financial performance, and are in line with prior studies, we choose to put emphasis on the 
results from our OLS models showing a significant negative effect of ESG on financial 
performance. 
 
4.1.4 Discussion on the negative relationship 
Our results indicate that the effect of ESG performance on financial performance is negative 
in the European basic materials industry. The sign of the ESG coefficient is negative in all 
OLS estimations that are statistically significant. The sign is negative independent on if the 
financial performance is Tobin’s q, or ROA, and in all forms of ESG; as aggregated score, see 
table 4.1, as disaggregated score, see table 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, our results are at first glance 
discouraging to firms in the European basic materials industry that are aiming to develop their 
ESG strategies. However, our results should not be interpreted as ESG activities having no 
positive impact on firm financial performance. On the contrary, we do believe that the 
positive impacts presented in our theory do hold and does contribute to a better financial 
output, but that the benefits do not outweigh the costs that are imposed on the firm from 
engaging in such activities, at least not in this industry and in the short run.  
 
We believe that environmental strategies aiming to improve effectiveness and productivity 
leads to lower costs for raw material and waste disposal which has a positive effect on 
financial firm performance at some point in time, but not in the short run as demonstrated by 
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our results. This is in line with Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), who achieve similar results as us, 
and discuss a comparison of ESG costs to R&D- or TQM (total quality management) costs. 
Such costs have short-term financial penalties, but may reap financial benefits for the firm in 
the long run (ibid.). Hart and Ahuja (1996) also find support for long-run financial benefits 
possibly stemming from ESG activities. Moreover, majority of studies that have proved a 
positive relationship between ESG- and financial performance, have investigated 
sustainability as a factor of long-term value creation (Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, it is 
beyond the scope of investigation of this thesis to make inferences about the long-term 
relationship between ESG- and financial performance, why we suggest further studies 
evaluating the ESG- and financial performance relationship in the long run. 
 
As mentioned, revisionist economic theory states that improved ESG performance leads to 
improved stakeholder relations on various markets. Improved stakeholder relationships on the 
consumers market means that a firm can add price premiums to their products or gain 
increases in market share, which in turn increases revenue (Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
Moreover, improved stakeholder relationships on the employers market attracts the best 
employees and retains them for a longer period of time, which increases effectiveness and 
revenue (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). Furthermore, improved stakeholder relationships on the 
financial market lead to a reduced cost of capital due to lowered risk premiums (Deutsche 
Bank, 2012). However, the underlying assumption is that stakeholder relationships are in fact 
improved. Thus our results indicate that firms within the European basic materials industry 
fail to do this. The improved stakeholder relationships derive from improved reputation and 
firm image. However, firms in the basic materials industry are often considered to be “dirty” 
firms, meaning they are associated with products and activities that are considered as non-
sustainable or labeled as unethical or environmentally unfriendly. Therefore, they are also 
considered to have questionable practices by nature, which makes it harder for them to create 
an ESG oriented profile and improve stakeholder relationships. Moreover, firms within the 
basic materials industry often offer their products business to business and not to the end-
consumer directly. The business to business-market has been shown to be less sensitive to 
ESG related issues (Sahut and Pasquini-Descomps, 2015), which adds on to the difficulties 
for these firms to gain competitive advantages due to engagement in ESG.  
 
The majority of prior studies that succeeds in proving a significant positive relationship 
between ESG performance and financial performance demonstrate this from using cost of 
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capital as a financial performance measure (see Lee et al., 2009; Goss, 2009; Goss and 
Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul et. al, 2011; Peylo, 2012). For example Peylo proved in his study 
that sustainable firms enjoy a lower cost of capital than their peers both regarding cost of debt 
and cost of equity as financiers puts a lower risk premium on these firms (Peylo, 2012). 
However, a substantial difference between Peylo’s study and our study is that Peylo 
investigated 30 German firms that were not limited to one industry. Thus, the study of Peylo 
is not limited to firms with the ‘questionable’ characteristics such as the basic materials firms, 
which could explain why his inferences on the relationship between financial- and ESG 
performance differs from ours. The same explanation could be imposed on the other studies 
proving a positive relationship, as they also have other industries as a scope of investigation, 
either US samples ranging over all industries (see Goss, 2009; Goss and Roberts 2011; El 
Ghoul et al. 2011) or using global samples, also ranging over all industries (see Lee et al., 
2009). Furthermore, El. Ghoul et al. (2011) finds that firms that participate in “dirty” 
industries has a higher cost of equity, while ESG oriented firms can enjoy a lower cost of 
equity. Hence, that we find a negative relationship between ESG and financial performance in 
the European basic materials industry indicates that shareholders puts higher emphasis on the 
“dirty”-factor than on good ESG performance within this industry. However, it is important to 
note that we do not prove that there are no financial benefits arising from a potential lower 
cost of capital in this industry. Nonetheless, from our results we can conclude that if such 
benefits would exist, they do not outweigh the costs related to ESG initiatives, at least not in 
the short run.  
 
Thornton, Kagan and Gunningham (2003) on the other hand, find a negative relationship 
between ESG and financial performance. They also investigated firms included in the basic 
materials industry. This strengthens our argument that our found negative impact of ESG on 
financial performance is highly related to our choice of industry. Firms within particularly 
harmful industries do not gain enough financial benefits to compensate for the costs, due to 
their difficulties to improve their image and thus stakeholder relations. Furthermore, Hart and 
Ahuja (1996) conduct a study with a similar methodology as ours and find the relationship 
between ESG- and financial performance to be negative. They also evaluate financial 
performance as ratios, more precisely return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and, 
return on sales (ROS), and measure ESG performance with time lags. Thus, as our results are 
in line with prior studies we argue that they are credible.  
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4.2 The non-linear relationship between ESG and financial performance 
Several researchers argue that the true relationship between ESG and financial performance is 
non-linear (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Wagner and Schaltegger, 2004), but the 
characteristics of the proposed non-linear relationship differ between studies. Our results 
presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7 indicate that the true relationship between ESG and financial 
performance in the European basic materials industry is not u-shaped or inverse u-shaped. 
Instead it is over all negative. 
 
4.2.1 The u-shaped or inverse u-shaped relationship between ESG and financial 
performance 
In table 4.6 we present the results we obtain when we run model (6): 
 
(6) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1
2 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Table 4.6 Impact of squared ESG (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
ESG Score (one year lag)  .0001  -.0369 
  (.0091)  (.0919) 
ESG^2 Score (one year lag)  -.0001  -.0002 
  (.0001)  (.0008) 
Size  .1283*** 1.4140*** 
  (.0484)  (.4137) 
Age  -.0126  .0475 
  (.0433)  (.4458) 
R&D  .0514**  .0704 
  (.0235)  (.2220) 
Risk  -.0003  .0497 
  (.0065)  (.0648) 
Leverage  -.0064  -.1183*** 
  (.0038)*  (.0228) 
Constant  -.7740  -10.3826 
  (1.0231)  (9.1840) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6370 0.5065 
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Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
 
To test whether a u-shaped or inverse u-shaped relationship exists in the European basic 
materials industry, we regress the squared ESG score on financial results, see model (6). 
Our results show that the relationship between ESG and financial performance is neither u-
shaped nor inverse u-shaped as model (6) shows insignificant results for the squared ESG 
coefficient. This means that conclusions presented by previous research, such as Barnett and 
Salomon (2012) and Wagner and Schaltegger (2004) do not apply in the European basic 
materials industry. Instead, based on results from our previous regressions, we argue that the 
relationship is all over negative. 
 
As mentioned, our results contradict the findings of Barnett and Salomon (2012) that 
demonstrate that the relationship between ESG and financial performance is u-shaped. There 
are some possible explanations for this that are based on the theory behind the u-shaped 
relationship presented by Barnett and Salomon (2012). Fist, a possible explanation is that the 
firms included in our study all perform poorly on ESG parameters, and will therefore not be 
found on the right side of the u-shape where ESG activities are translated into improved 
financial results (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). However, there are not only 
unethical/environmentally unfriendly companies included in our study. The mean for the 
aggregated ESG score, on a scale between 0 and 100, is approximately 60, and the dispersion 
between the worst in class and best in class is substantial. The maximum ESG performance is 
approximately 96, whereas the minimum ESG performance is approximately 6. This means 
that under other circumstances the best performing firms would be found on the right side of 
the u-shape. But apparently the relationship between ESG and financial performance is over 
all negative. Hence, we can reject this explanation. A second possible explanation is that since 
the basic materials industry is labelled as a typically ”dirty” industry, ESG activities 
performed within this industry does not seem credible to stakeholders and may instead be 
perceived as “greenwashing”. Thus, these activities are unable to contribute to improved 
relationships with stakeholders and therefore the breaking point where negative financial 
results turn positive does not exist. Therefore, firms within this industry cannot reap the 
financial benefits of ESG but are still left with the costs. This explanation is also in line with 
the reasoning of Barnett and Salomon (2012), and therefore we argue that this is the most 
credible explanation. 
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Since the squared ESG score is not statistically significant, our results shows that in the 
European basic materials industry there is neither an inverse u-shaped relationship between 
financial performance and ESG performance. Based on theory put forward by researchers 
such as Wagner and Schaltegger (2004), this indicates that the firms within this industry do 
not have a profit maximizing aim or strategy for their ESG activities. Furthermore, this 
conclusion is supported by the fact that firms within this industry faces stringent regulations 
regarding sustainability due to the nature of their business (Halme, M & Huse, M., 1997). 
Therefore, investing more in ESG activities than are required by regulations, would have a 
negative impact on financial results (Wagner and Schaltegger, 2004), which supports our 
results.  
4.2.2 The logged relationship between ESG and financial performance 
In table 4.7 we present the results we obtain when we run model (7): 
 
(7) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Table 4.7 Impact of Log (ESG) (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
Log ESG_t-1  -.2332*  -2.136* 
  (.1280)  (1.1722) 
Size  .1134**  1.3034*** 
  (.0510)  (.4272) 
Age  -.0133  .0392 
  (.0438)  (.4408) 
R&D  .0495**  .0476 
  (.0240)  (.2236) 
Risk  .0018  .0640 
  (.0068)  (.0669) 
Leverage  -.0070*  -.1233*** 
  (.0040)  (.0237) 
Constant  .1636  -3.2832 
  (1.1398)  (9.6871) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.6298 0.5010 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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The non-existing (inverse) u-shaped relationship is further supported through the significant 
negative results we obtain when we test model (7), regressing logged ESG on financial 
results, as presented in table 4.7. This indicates that the true relationship has more similarities 
to a logged relationship than a u-shaped or inverse u-shaped relationship. The coefficient of 
ESG performance in log form on financial performance is approximately -2.14 when 
estimating ROA, meaning an increase in ESG score by one unit results in a 0.0214% decrease 
in ROA. When estimating Tobin’s q it is -0.23, meaning an increase in ESG score by one unit 
results in a 0.0023% decrease in Tobin’s q. This indicates a negative and non-linear 
relationship between ESG performance and financial performance, meaning it is downward 
sloping but levels out as the ESG score increases. However, the R-squared is lower when 
regressing logged ESG score on financial performance than when regressing the 
untransformed aggregated ESG score, meaning the non-linear model (7) has less explanatory 
power than the linear model (1). Moreover, the logged ESG score is significant on a 10% 
significance level, compared to a 5% significance level for the untransformed ESG score. 
Hence, we cannot conclude from these results whether the real relationship is linear or non-
linear. Thus, the true relationship may be more complex than anticipated and further research 
is needed to identify it. According to theory presented by Wagner and Schaltegger (2004), the 
true relationship between ESG and financial performance in the European basic materials 
industry may be downward sloping at an increasing rate, due to the stringent regulations. 
However, to investigate this relationship is beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, since this 
proposed relationship has more similarities to the relationship between the logged form of 
ESG and financial performance than squared ESG and financial performance, this could 
explain why we get significant results when testing model (7) but not when testing model (6).  
 
Ullman (1985) argues that there should be a nonlinear relationship between financial 
performance and ESG performance, and that it could be explained by the ambivalent nature of 
ESG. On the one hand, firms are sometimes forced to practice ESG and it is generally 
accepted as beneficial for the sake of employees, external stakeholders and surroundings, and 
might also mitigate risk and affect the future license to operate (Porter, 1991, Deutsche Bank 
Group, 2012, Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, Sprinkle and Maines, 2010). On the other hand it 
is costly, and managers that spend too much on sustainable investments might be faced with 
the neo-classical arguments that one is practicing a lavish type of spending and wasting 
resources, which necessarily will decrease shareholder value (Palmer et al., 1995; Siebert et 
al., 1980, Friedman, 1962). Since both financial advantages and disadvantages of ESG exist, 
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we argue that the relationship between ESG and financial performance should be more 
complex than a linear relationship, and should therefore be non-linear. 
 
4.3 Summary and evaluation of hypotheses 
Based on the results presented in tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.7 we conclude that the effect of 
ESG on financial performance in the European basic materials industry is negative. Therefore, 
we do not reject hypothesis (1). However, we cannot conclude whether the true relationship 
between ESG and financial performance is linear or non-linear, meaning if financial results 
decrease with the same rate for every additional unit of ESG score or if it decreases at an 
increasing or decreasing rate. Hence, we do not reject hypothesis (2).   
 
Hypotheses  
1. There is a negative relationship between ESG-performance 
and financial performance in the European basic materials 
industry. Not Rejected 
2. There is a non-linear relationship between ESG-performance 
and financial performance in the European basic materials 
industry. Not Rejected 
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6. Conclusion 
In the following section we provide our conclusion based on our results and analysis. 
Furthermore, we present a suggestion for future research and possible solutions to the 
problems we have found.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In this thesis, we investigate the relationship between ESG performance and financial 
performance for firms in the European basic materials industry through a series of multiple 
regressions. Consistent with previous empirical studies, we find that the relationship is 
negative. However, like many previous researchers, we cannot conclude whether the true 
relationship between ESG- and financial performance is linear or non-linear. This indicates 
that the relationship is more complex than we first anticipated, and further research is needed 
to identify it. 
 
Since the relationship is negative, we can conclude that the financial benefits of ESG 
activities do not outweigh the costs in the European basic materials industry. This indicates 
that firms within this particular industry do not have the right conditions to reap the financial 
benefits of ESG to a sufficient extent. A crucial element for the business case of ESG is 
improved stakeholder relations which create competitive advantages in markets such as the 
consumer market, employers market, and financial market. However, in the European basic 
materials industry ESG activities do not imply improved stakeholders relationships. Since the 
ESG activities are not in consonance with the firms’ character due to the unsustainable nature 
of their business, the ESG activities are not perceived as credible by stakeholders. Thus, 
stakeholder relationships remain unaffected and the positive impact on financial performance 
fails to materialize. At the same time, the firms are forced to bear the costs of ESG due to 
stringent regulation, which results in an overall negative impact.  
 
Presumably, the ESG activities lead to direct cost reductions in form of e.g. energy efficiency, 
waste reduction and reduced agency costs. However, these cost reductions are not enough to 
compensate for the initial cost of investment in the ESG activities in the short run. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that ESG can have a positive impact on financial performance in 
the long run, as previous literature argues that it takes several years for ESG to materialize 
into financial results (Hart and Ahuja, 1996). Thus, we recommend future studies to 
investigate this relationship over a longer period of time.        
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In order to reverse global degradation it is important to create financial incentives to engage 
in ESG for firms in particularly harmful industries, such as the basic materials industry. 
Shifting the focus from short-term to long-term financial goals could be one of several actions 
to help firms find financial meaning to engage in ESG (UN PRI, 2012). Furthermore, tougher 
penalties, in form of for example higher fines when performing poorly on ESG parameters, 
would create a financial incentive to improve ESG performance. Moreover, increased 
reporting on ESG activities, so called Integrated Reporting, will make basic materials firms’ 
ESG status more accessible and transparent to various stakeholders. This would mitigate the 
credibility problem and improve the vital stakeholder relationships that create competitive 
advantages in various markets. In turn, ESG activities performed within the European basic 
materials industry would be given the opportunity to positively impact financial results. 
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Appendix 1 Variables, definitions and sources of data 
        
Table A.1 – Variables, definitions and sources of data 
Variables Description Datastream code 
Environmental (E) The environmental pillar measures a company's impact on living and non-living natural systems, including 
the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in 
order to generate long-term shareholder value. 
 
ENVSCORE 
Social (S) The social pillar measures a company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, 
customers and society, through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company's 
reputation and the health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability to 
generate long term shareholder value. 
 
SOCSCORE 
Corporate 
Governance (G) 
The corporate governance pillar measures a company's systems and processes, which ensure that its 
board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a 
company's capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and 
responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate 
long-term shareholder value. 
 
CGVSCORE 
ROA (Net income + ((Interest Expense on Debt – Interest expense capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / (Average of 
Last Year’s and current year’s Total Assets *100) 
WC08326 
Tobin’s q (Market Capitalization + Market Value) / (Total liabilities + Common stock)  
Size Market capitalization MV 
Age t* - Company Founded Date (WC18272)  
R&D   
Leverage Total Debt % Common Equity WC08231 
Risk Standard deviation calculated on weekly returns  
Country  GEOC 
Business Sector   
*Year between 2003 and 2013 
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Appendix 2 – ESG without time lag  
 
(8) 𝜑𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
Table A.3 Impact of ESG  (OLS) 
Independent Variables (1) Tobin's Q (2) ROA 
ESG _t-1 -.00385** -.0671* 
 (.00189) (.0253) 
ESG .000177 .028 
 (.00146) (.026) 
Size .0491*** .824*** 
 (.0176) (.319) 
Age .0165 .0178 
 (.0159) (.249) 
R&D .0273** .0169 
 (.0110) (.143) 
Risk .0779 1.162 
 (.188) (2.659) 
Leverage -.00174 -.0818*** 
 (.00169) (.0209) 
Constant -.360 -3.834 
 (.307) (5.471) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subsector fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 457 452 
R-squared 0.816 0.587 
Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Appendix 3 – Correlation between variables  
 
 
Table A.2. Correlation between E, S and G 
 E S G 
E 1.00   
S 0.80 1.00  
G 0.32 0.46 1.00 
 
 
Table A.3. Correlation between E/S and G 
 E/S G 
E/S 1.00  
G 0.41 1.00 
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Appendix 4 - Key performance indicators for ESG parameters  
 
Environmental parameter (E) 
Examples of Environmental data points and KPIs are: the percentage of company sites or 
subsidiaries that are certified with any environmental management system; total CO2 and 
CO2 equivalents emission in tonnes; total amount of waste produced in tonnes; whether the 
company claim to have an ISO 14000 certification; total direct and indirect energy 
consumption in gigajoules; whether the company describe initiatives to reduce the energy 
footprint of its products during their use; total recycled and reused waste produced in tonnes; 
total amount of environmental expenditures. 
 
Social parameter (S) 
Examples of Social data points and KPIs are: percentage of employee turnover; number of 
injuries and fatalities reported by employees and contractors while working for the company; 
number of controversies linked to business ethics in general, political contributions or bribery 
and corruption; average hours of training per year per employee; percentage of women 
managers; average age of employees; total amount of all donations by the company; number 
of controversies linked to human rights issues; number of controversies published in the 
media linked to customer health and safety. 
 
Corporate Governance parameter (G) 
Examples of corporate Governance data points and KPIs are: whether the company comply 
with regulations regarding the general effectiveness and independence of its board 
committees; whether the company comply with regulations regarding board independence; 
whether the company comply with regulations on performance oriented compensation; 
whether the company have a policy regarding shareholder rights; number of controversies 
published in the media linked to shareholder engagement infringements; the percentage 
ownership by voting power of the single biggest owner. 
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Appendix 5 – Comments on the control variables  
 
Firm Size 
Firm size can affect the ability to practice sustainable investments, where larger firms might 
have greater resources to invest in sustainable actions (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Further, 
large firms might be more pressured by stakeholders to take sustainable actions (Rettab et. al, 
2009). Further, too small firms might not have enough resources to address social 
responsibilities properly nor report on sustainable initiatives (Galbreath and Shum, 2012; 
Gallo and Christensen, 2011). The opposite could also prove true as larger firms have higher 
responsibilities and are more pressured towards financial goals at the expense of sustainable 
goals, thus affecting sustainable performance negatively (Wu, 2006). 
 
Prior studies suggest a positive impact of size on financial performance, arguing that large 
firms generate stronger competition (Baum, 1996). Orlitzky (2001) argues that there is a 
positive correlation between firm size and financial performance due to greater control over 
resources and external stakeholders, and greater attraction and retention of better employees. 
Size could also have a negative impact on financial performance, as larger firms might be 
more bureaucratic and inert than smaller more flexible firms (Wu, 2006). 
 
Since size is argued to affect both sustainable and financial performance, we choose to 
include size as a control variable in our model. 
  
Risk 
When one investigates the relationship between firm performance and sustainable 
performance, risk is among the most common factors to control for (Margolis et al. 2007). 
 
Risk mitigation is one of the reasons why firms engage in sustainable activities (Deutsche 
Bank Group, 2012). Financiers will add risk and liquidity premiums to the cost of capital for 
firms with questionable practices, and higher default risks and dissolved stakeholder 
relationships are associated with poor environmental management (ibid.). 
 
Feldman et al. (1997) found that firms that manage sustainability risks obtain a lower cost of 
capital, and create shareholder value by working proactively and therefore being less risky. 
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Firms that are potential objects of lawsuits, criminal legal proceedings and regulatory 
governmental intervention, due to for example pollution or other violations that could be 
measured from a sustainability point of view, faces an increased firm risk, and usually have a 
low ESG score (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001). On the other hand, many managers and 
financial analysts believe that corporate sustainable engagement increases firm risk (Orlitzky 
and Benjamin 2001).  
  
Industry 
Prior studies use industry as control variable (see Graves and Waddock, 1994; Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2006; Margolis et al., 2007; Rettab et al., 2009; Galbreath and Shum, 2012; 
Saeidia et al., 2015). 
 
Not only practices of sustainable performance vary across industries, but also industries are 
looked upon as more or less “dirty”, depending on what activities they are associated with 
(Margolis et al. 2007). We limit this uncertainty as we only focus on one industry, the basic 
materials. 
 
However, even though we only focus on the basic materials industry, we control for the 
business activity on a higher level, by controlling for business sector, which is the second 
level of activity classification in Thomson Reuters’ organization of business activity. The 
three business sectors are the following: Chemicals, Mineral Resources, and Applied 
Resources. 
 
In the Chemicals sector, firms are working with producing paint, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
other chemicals, to name a few. In the Mineral Resources sector, firms are working with e.g. 
gold-, silver-, and coal mining, steel, smelting and alloying, and other activities associated 
with metals and mining. In the Applied Resources sector, firms are working with e.g. paper 
products, pulp, containers, and packaging. The distribution over business sectors can be seen 
in table 3.3.  
 
Age 
Previous studies control for age (see Margolis et al., 2007; Rettab et al., 2009; Galbreath and 
Shum, 2012; Saeidia et al., 2015). 
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Age can have a positive effect on financial performance as older firms have survived through 
a selection process, to a greater extent than younger firms have. However, over time the weak 
firms are eliminated, why one would expect a positive correlation between financial 
performance and firm age (Jovanovic, 1982). Jovanovic (1982) also states that firms over 
time are pressured to increase profits in order to survive, and with age learns how to be 
efficient. Barron et al. (1994) on the other hand argues that as firms get old, they get more 
inert and less productive, hence pointing out a negative relationship between financial 
performance and firm age. 
 
Leverage 
It is argued that because of interest expenses and debt repayments, high leverage reduces cash 
flow available for investment, and therefore also reduces firm ability to invest in projects 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). Harrison and Coombs (2006) argue that social performance is 
costly, and that firms with a high leverage will have low ESG scores. In their study they 
manage to find evidence that high leveraged firms neglect both employee and product areas 
associated with social performance (Harrison and Coombs, 2006). 
 
For firm performance, the use of debt to a reasonable extent is advantageous. Debt financing 
is cheaper than equity financing as tax interest is a deductible expense, thus creating value for 
the shareholders as the cost of capital tends to fall as leverage is increased (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). However, as Modigliani and Miller also puts forward, when taken too far, the 
yields demanded by lenders tends to increase as the leverage of the firm goes up, and points 
out that there is a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the cost of capital as the risk of 
bankruptcy increases with increased leverage. Increased leverage may also limit the freedom 
of the managers as creditors get to stipulate the terms (ibid.) and the fact that mandated to pay 
debt holders might limit unprofitable decisions (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Mendelson (1970) suggests there would be a high correlation between the cost of capital and 
the return on assets, why the same is suggested in this study. 
 
R&D 
Padgett and Galan (2010) show that sustainable performance and Research and Development 
(R&D) intensity are positively related. They also state that R&D intensity varies according to 
the industry and is usually more intense in manufacturing industries than in non-
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manufacturing ones and that R&D intensive industries may face particular incentives to 
engage in CSR activities that boost the long-term supply of highly skilled labor (Padgett and 
Galan, 2010). McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argued and showed the positive relationship 
between social social performance and R&D intensity since they are associated with process 
and product innovation, the two are positively correlated. 
 
A firm’s intangible assets are positively related to Tobin’s q of a firm (Black et al., 2006) and 
several studies finds a positive relationship between R&D intensity and Tobin’s q (see 
Connolly and Hirschey (2005); Dutta et. al (2005); Gleason and Klock (2006), Black et al., 
2006). Moreover, Danielson (2005) finds that R&D expenses can distort the ROA 
measurement. Since it is argued that R&D affects both sustainable and financial performance, 
we decide to include R&D in the model. 
 
Geography 
Sustainable performance has a tendency to differ across geographical regions (Halme, M. and 
Huse, M. 1997). Reasons might be cultural differences and attitudes towards sustainability. 
Some regions are considered being more responsible than others, such as the Scandinavian 
region (Samuelsson and Westergren, 2014), which is recognized as green and forward 
looking in sustainable terms.  Even though the legal framework within Europe is similar when 
it comes to regulations that govern ESG, there are still large differences across countries in 
Europe when dealing with sustainability issues. Through the use of dummy variables, the 
study controls for differences across European countries that might affect the collective 
sustainable performance of the sample. 
 
Due to natural differences and macroeconomic conditions, financial performance could differ 
across countries and regions that are subject to different laws and regulations that firms are 
subject to. Geographical impacts on financial performance are anticipated to be either positive 
or negative. 
 
 
 
